COMELEC Rules of Procedure [1]

COMELEC

Rules of Procedure

PART I

INTRODUCTORY PROVISIONS

 

(February 15, 1993)

 

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Rule 1

Title and Construction

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Section 1.  Title of the Rules. - These rules shall be known and cited as the COMELEC Rules of Procedure.

Sec. 2.  Applicability. - These rules, except Part VI, shall apply to all actions and proceedings brought before the Commission. Part VI shall apply to election contests and quo warranto cases cognizable by courts of general jurisdiction.

Sec. 3.  Construction. - These rules shall be liberally construed in order to promote the effective and efficient implementation of the objectives of ensuring the holding of free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections and to achieve just, expeditious and inexpensive determination and disposition of every action and proceeding brought before the Commission.

Sec. 4.  Suspension of the Rules. - In the interest of justice and in order to obtain speedy disposition of all matters pending before the Commission, these rules or any portion thereof may be suspended by the Commission.

Sec. 5. Meaning of Words. - Whenever used in these Rules, the following words or terms shall mean:

a.  Commission -- the Commission on Elections  

b.  Division -- a Division of the Commission on Elections  

c.  Chairman -- the Chairman of the Commission on Elections

d.  Commissioner -- a Commissioner of the Commission on Elections  

e.  Member -- the Chairman or a Commissioner 

f.  Ordinary Actions -- shall refer to Election Protests, Quo warranto, and Appeals from decisions of courts in election protest cases 

g.  Special Actions -- shall refer to Petitions to deny course to certificate of candidacy, to declare a candidate as a nuisance candidate, to disqualify a candidate or to postpone or suspend an election

h.  Special Cases -- shall refer to Pre-proclamation cases 

i.  Special Reliefs -- shall refer to Certiorari, Prohibition, Mandamus and Contempt

j.  Provisional Remedies -- shall refer to injunction and/or restraining order 

k.  Special Proceedings -- shall refer to annulment of permanent list of voters, registration of political parties and accreditation of citizens' arms of the Commission

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Larena vs Teves

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT

Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-42439

December 10, 1934

ANTONIO LARENA, petitioner-appellee, 

- versus -

PEDRO TEVES, respondent-appellant.

Lamberto L. Macias for appellant.
Enrique Medina for appellee.

 DECISION

VILLA-REAL, J.:

This is an appeal taken by the respondent, Pedro Teves, from the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Oriental Negros, the dispositive part of which reads as follows:

For the foregoing considerations, the court declares the election of the respondent, Pedro Teves, to the office of municipal president of Dumaguete, Oriental Negros, null and void, and, consequently, he is not entitled to assume said office, with costs against said respondent.   So ordered.

In support of his appeal, the appellant assigns the following alleged errors as committed by the court a quo in its decision in question, to wit:

1. The lower court erred in not holding that the legal residence of the respondent-appellant, Pedro Teves, from 1904 at least, up to the present, has always been, and still is, the municipality of Dumaguete, Oriental Negros.
2. The lower court erred in holding that Pedro Teves changed his legal residence from Dumaguete to the municipality of Bacong, Oriental Negros, in 1919, when the respondent-appellant registered as an elector in the latter municipality and ran for representative of the second district of Oriental Negros.
3. Even admitting, for the sake of argument that Pedro Teves' residence was changed from Dumaguete to Bacong in 1919, the lower court erred in not holding that Pedro Teves re-acquired his legal residence in the municipality of Dumaguete much more than one year prior to June 5, 1934.
4. The lower court erred in holding that the cases of Yra vs. Abaño (52 Phil., 380), and Vivero vs. Murillo (52 Phil., 694) are not applicable to the case at bar.
5. The lower court erred in holding that Pedro Teves is ineligible to the office of municipal president of Dumaguete, Oriental Negros.
6. The lower court erred in not granting respondent-appellant's motion for a new trial.

The principal question to be decided in this appeal is whether or not the respondent-appellant, Pedro Teves, who was born in the municipality of Dumaguete, Oriental Negros, and who, from the year 1904 up to the present, has had his own house in said municipality and lived with his family in said house, may be considered a resident thereof for the purposes of the Election Law, notwithstanding the fact that in the year 1919 he registered in the list of voters of the municipality of Bacong; ran for representative for the second district of Oriental Negros to which said municipality of Bacong belongs; again ran for reelection in the year 1922; and launched his candidacy for member of the provincial board of Oriental Negros in 1925, stating under oath in his certificates of candidacy that he was a resident of said municipality of Bacong, Oriental Negros, without having ever registered as elector in any of the precincts of the municipality of Dumaguete from said year, 1919, up to the present, and having ordered the cancellation of his name in the list of voters of said municipality of Bacong only on April 5, 1934.

In the case of Nuval vs. Guray (52 Phil., 645), this court laid down the following doctrine:

. . . The term "residence" as so used, in synonymous with "domicile" which imports not only intention to reside in a fixed place, but also personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention." (People vs. Bender, 144 N.Y.S., 145.)

In 20 Corpus Juris, page 68, paragraph 26, it is also stated in follows:

. . . The term "residence" as used in constitutional and statutory provisions relating to the qualifications of electors is synonymous with home or domicile, denoting a permanent dwelling place, to which the party when absent intends to return. While one cannot by intention alone fix his dwelling place, yet the fact of residence for the purpose of voting depends largely on the intention of the person offering to vote, and a sojourn in a place, however long, without the intention of making it a permanent home, will not qualify the sojourner as an elector, unless it is otherwise provided by constitution or statute. Hence the right to vote in a certain precinct requires the concurrence of two things — the act of residing coupled with the intention to do so. . . .

In the case of Vivero vs. Murillo (52 Phil., 694), this court laid down the following rule:

ELECTIONS; RESIDENCE OF CANDIDATE. — A student living with his parents in a certain barrio of a municipality, which barrio is later separated to be organized as an independent municipality, who for several years pursues his studies in several provinces of the archipelago, supported by his parents, returning to the latter's home during his vacations in the newly organized municipality, does not lose his residence in said municipality, either on account of having resided in different provinces as a student, or of having registered as a voter in the former municipality, and is eligible as municipal president of the new municipality even if his registration as voter in the municipality to which the new one originally belonged has not been cancelled.

In the case of Yra vs. Abaño (52 Phil., 380), this court laid down the following doctrine:

2.  ID.; ID.; ID.; ID. — The Election Law makes use of the terms "qualified voter in his municipality", and "qualified elector therein." To be a qualified voter, does not necessarily mean that a person must be a registered voter. It is sufficient for the candidate to possess all of the qualifications prescribed in section 431 and none of the disqualifications prescribed in section 432. The fact that a candidate failed to register as an elector in the municipality does not deprive him of the right to become a candidate and to be voted for.

In this case the respondent-appellant, Pedro Teves, from the year 1904 has had his own house in the municipality of Dumaguete, Oriental Negros, wherein he has constantly been living with his family and he has never had any house in which he lived either alone or with his family in the municipality of Bacong of said province. All that he has done in the latter municipality was to register as elector in 1919, through an affidavit stating that he was a resident of said municipality; run for representative for the second district of the province of Oriental Negros and vote in said municipality in said year; run again for reelection in the year 1922; launch his candidacy for member of the provincial board of said province in 1925, stating under oath in all his certificates of candidacy that he was a resident of said municipality of Bacong.

The affidavit made by him upon registering as elector in the municipality of Bacong in the year 1919, stating that he was a resident of said municipality; his two certificates of candidacy for the office of representative for the second district of the Province of Oriental Negros, which were filed, the former in the year 1919 and the latter in the year 1922, and the certificate of candidacy for the office of member of the provincial board filed by him in the year 1925, in every one of which he stated that he was a resident of the municipality of Bacong, are at most a prima facie evidence of the fact of his residence in the municipality of Bacong, which is required by law in order that the corresponding officials could register him as an elector and candidate, and not conclusive, and may be attacked in a corresponding judicial proceeding. If, according to the ruling laid down in the case of Vivero vs. Murillo, cited above, mere registration in a municipality in order to be an elector therein does not make one a resident of said municipality; if, according to constant rulings the word "residence" is synonymous with "home" or "domicile", and denotes a permanent dwelling place, to which an absent person intends to return; if the right to vote in a municipality requires the concurrence of two things, the act of residing coupled with the intention to do so; and if the herein respondent-appellant, Pedro Teves, has always lived with his family in the municipality of Dumaguete and never in that of Bacong, he has never lost his residence in Dumaguete. The fact that his registration as elector in the municipality of Bacong was cancelled only on April 5, 1934, upon his petition, did not disqualify him to be a candidate for the office of municipal president of said municipality of Dumaguete on the ground that, as has been stated in the case of Yra vs. Abaño, cited above, registration in the list of voters is not one of the conditions prescribed by section 431 of the Election Law in order to be an elector; neither does failure to register as such constitute one of the disqualifications prescribed in section 432 of said law.

Inasmuch as the respondent-appellant, Pedro Teves has had his legal residence in the municipality of Dumaguete from the year 1904 up to the present, without having acquired another outside said municipality, and as he has all the other qualifications prescribed by law in order to be a qualified elector, his election to the office of a municipal president is valid and in accordance with law.

For the foregoing considerations, this court is of the opinion and so holds that a person, who has his own house wherein he lives with his family in a municipality without having ever had the intention of abandoning it and without having lived either alone or with his family in another municipality, has his residence in the former municipality, notwithstanding his having registered as an elector in the other municipality in question and having been a candidate for various Insular and provincial positions, stating every time that he is a resident of the latter municipality.

WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is reversed and the election of the respondent, Pedro Teves, to the office of municipal president of Dumaguete, Oriental Negros, is declared lawful and valid, with the right to assume said office, with costs against the appellee. 


SO ORDERED.

Malcolm, Imperial, Butte, and Goddard, JJ., concur.

Vivero vs. Murillo

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT

Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-30271

January 30, 1929

NICASIO M. VIVERO, plaintiff-appellant, 

- versus -

MATEO G. MURILLO, defendant-appellee.

Kapunan and Kapunan for appellant.

Roque Marcos and Francisco Enaje for appellee.

DECISION

VILLA-REAL, J.:

This quo warranto proceedings is before us upon an appeal taken by the protestant Nicasio Vivero from the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Leyte denying the remedy sought, dismissing the proceeding and sentencing the plaintiff to pay the costs.

To support his appeal the appellant assigns eight alleged error which we shall consider in the course of this decision.

The following were facts established at the trial by a preponderance of the evidence:

Mateo G. Murillo, the defendant-appellee, was born in the barrio of Paliway, municipality of La Paz, of the Province of Leyte, where he lived with his parents and received his primary education.  In order to continue his studies he removed first to Tacloban, Leyte, and later to Calbayog, Samar, and finally to Manila until the year 1927, at the same time acting as private secretary to Senator Veloso.  Every year he return to his native town to spend his vacations which usually lasted from two weeks to one month, remaining alternately in his parents' house and in that of his brothers.  While he studied he was supported by his parents.  With the approach of the general elections of 1925 Senator Veloso assigned him to Burauen, Leyte, for the purpose of compaigning for him.  While in that municipality he he registered there as voter. But before the elections at that year Murillo returned to Manila in order to continue his law studies. In December 1926, he went back to La Paz and formally, though verbally, announced his candidacy for the office of municipal president of said municipality at the general elections of 1928. In the same year 1926 he ordered some wood to be prepared or sawed to be used in the construction of a house for his residence.  Later on Murillo returned to Manila and thence wrote to his friends, relatives, and acquaintances, telling them of his candidacy for the office of municipal president of La Paz.  For the purposes of said candidacy, Murillo frequently went to his native town.  In the month of February, 1927, he brought his family there, leaving them in his parents' house when he went back to Manila.  In the month of July of the same year he returned to La Paz and lived there with his aforesaid family and later came to manila. Lastly, in the month of November, 1927, he returned to his said municipality, and did not leave it until the general elections in, June, 1928.  On April 4, 1928, Mateo G. Murillo went to Pascual Esplanada, a notary public in the town of the municipality of Burauen, Leyte, to subscribe to a petition under oath which was presented to the municipal treasurer of that municipality to have his name as a voter in Burauen cancelled.  On April 14 of the same year, in registering as a voter in the second precinct of La Paz, said defendant Mateo G. Murillo presented a copy of his petition for cancellation to the chairman of the board of inspectors of said municipality, Pedro Tubio.  The municipality of La Paz was formely a barrio of the municipality of Burauen, having been organized as an independent municipality in 1918.

The only question to decide in this appeal is whether or not the defendant-appellee, Mateo G. Murillo, had a legal residence in the municipality of La Paz before the general elections of 1928 in order to be eligible to the office of the president of said municipality.

It will be seen that Mateo G. Murillo has always, since his childhood, been a resident of La Paz, not only while it was still a barrio of the Municipality of Burauen, but also after it became an independent municipality, and he did not absent himself therefrom except when studying, first in Tacloban, Leyte, later in Calbayog, Samar, and finally in Manila.  By the mere fact of having lived in Tacloban, Leyte, in Calbayog, Samar, and in Manila, as a student, the defendant-appellee did not acquire legal residence in said towns, nor lose his residence in La Paz, because, being single, and supported by his parents while studying, he was dependent on them and their residence was his and it does not appear that he acquired an independent legal residence anywhere else.

While it is true that the defendant-appellee registered as a voter in Burauen in the general elections of 1925, yet he did so without any thereto, for it does not appear that he resided in Burauen at any time after the separation of the barrio of La Paz from said municipality and its organization as an independent municipality, nor that he transferred his residence to the former abandoning that of his parents.  On the contrary, having continued his studies in Manila, supported by his parents, returning to the latter's home during his vacations, it is presumed that he continued to reside with them until the month of November, 1927, when he established his residence in the town of La Paz.

Moreover it is sufficiently proven that Mateo G. Murillo had applied in due time and form, for the cancellation of his name as a voter in the municipality of Burauen, and for his registration as a voter in the municipality of La Paz. Although it does not appear that said cancellation was registered he is not thereby rendered ineligible to the office of municipal president according to the doctrine recently laid down by this court in the quo warranto proceeding of Yra vs. Abano (p. 380, ante), wherein this court said the following:

1.  ELECTIONS; QUO WARRANTO; MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS; QUALIFICATIONS OF ELECTIVE MUNICIPAL OFFICERS; ELECTION LAW, SECTIONS 404, 431, AND 432, AND THE ADMINISTRATIVE CODE, SECTION 2174, CONSTRUED. — A candidate who was elected to the office of municipal president and who at the time of the election was registered as a voter of Manila and not of the municipality in which he was a candidate, is nevertheless eligible to the office, and proceedings in the nature of quo warranto instituted by virtue of the provisions of section 408 of the Election Law, as amended, by the vice-president elect of the municipality, who challenged the right of the municipal president elect, to the position to which elected on the ground that the municipal president was ineligible, cannot be successfully maintained.

2.  ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID. — The Election Law makes use of the terms "qualified voter in this municipality" and "qualified elector therein." To be a qualified voter does not necessarily mean that a person must be a registered voter. It is sufficient to the candidate to posses all the qualifications prescribed in section 431 and none of the disqualifications prescribed in section 432. The fact that a candidate failed to register as an elector in the municipality does not deprive him of the right to become a candidate and to be voted for.

3.  ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID. — One may be a qualified voter without exercising the right to vote. Registering does not confer the right; it is but a condition precedent to the exercise of the right. registration regulates the exercise of the right of suffrage.  It is not a qualification for such right.

In view of the foregoing considerations, we are of opinion and so hold, that a student living with his parents in a certain barrio of a municipality, which barrio is later separated to be organized as an independent municipality, who for several years pursues his studies in several provinces of the archipelago, supported by his parents, returning to the latters' home during his vacations in the newly organized municipality, does not loose his residence in said municipality, either on account of having resided in different provinces as a student, or of having registered as a voter in the former municipality and is eligible as municipal president of the new municipality even if his registration as a voter in the municipality to which the new one originally belong has not been cancelled.

By virtue wherof, and finding no error in the judgment appealed from, the same is hereby affirmed in its entirely, with costs against the appellant.  

SO ORDERED.

Johnson, Street, Malcolm, Villamor, Ostrand, Johns and Romualdez, JJ., concur.