Friday, August 7, 2009

G.R. No. 186224

EN BANC


G.R. No. 186224

August 25, 2009


CONSTANCIO D. PACANAN, JR.,

Petitioner,


- versus -


COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and

FRANCISCO M. LANGI, SR.,

Respondents.


x---------------------------------------------------------x


D E C I S I O N


LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:


Before the Court is a petition for certiorari which seeks to set aside 1) the Order[1] dated March 17, 2008 of the Commission on Elections (Comelec) First Division and 2) the Resolution[2] dated January 21, 2009 of the Comelec En Banc dismissing petitioner Constancio D. Pacanan, Jr.’s appeal from the Decision[3] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 27, Catbalogan, Samar, in Election Case No. 07-1, which declared private respondent Francisco M. Langi, Sr. as the winning Mayor of Motiong, Samar.


In the Order of March 17, 2008, the Comelec First Division dismissed the appeal for failure to pay the correct appeal fee as prescribed by the Comelec Rules of Procedure within the five-day reglementary period.


In the assailed Resolution dated January 21, 2009, the Comelec En Banc denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, declaring that the Comelec did not acquire jurisdiction over the appeal because of the non-payment of the appeal fee on time, and that the Comelec First Division was correct in dismissing the said appeal.


The antecedent facts are as follows:

Petitioner Constancio D. Pacanan, Jr. and private respondent Francisco M. Langi, Sr. were candidates for mayor in the municipality of Motiong, Samar during the May 14, 2007 elections. After the canvassing of votes, the Municipal Board of Canvassers (MBC) of Motiong, Samar proclaimed petitioner as the duly elected mayor, having garnered a total of 3,069 votes against private respondent’s 3,066 votes.


Thereafter, private respondent filed with the RTC a Protest[4] dated May 25, 2007 which was docketed as Election Case No. 07-1, contesting the results of the elections in ten (10) of the forty-nine (49) precincts in Motiong, Samar, and alleging acts of violence and intimidation and other election irregularities in the appreciation of the votes by the MBC. Thereafter, petitioner filed his Verified Answer with Counter-Protest[5] dated June 4, 2007, asserting that private respondent’s allegations of threat and intimidation, fraud and other irregularities in the conduct of elections were mere allegations unsupported by any documentary evidence. Petitioner also disputed the election results with respect to seven (7) precincts.


On January 7, 2008, the RTC rendered a decision[6] in Election Case 07-1, which declared private respondent as the winner in the May 14, 2007 mayoralty race for Motiong, Samar with a plurality of six (6) votes, viz:

Wherefore, in view of the foregoing Protestant Francisco M. Langi, Sr. having obtained the over all total votes of 3,074 and the Protestee’s 3,068 total and final votes is declared the winner in the Mayoralty contest in Motiong, Samar with a plurality of (6) votes. Therefore the proclamation on May 17, 2007 is hereby annulled and declared Francisco Langi, Sr. y Maceren as the duly elected Mayor of Motiong, Samar. The winner is awarded the amount of P 32,510 as actual damages and no evidence aliunde for damages for the court to award. xxx

On January 10, 2008, petitioner filed a notice of appeal and paid P3,000.00 appeal fee per Official Receipt No. 6822663 before the RTC, Branch 27, Catbalogan, Samar. He also appealed the RTC decision dated January 7, 2008 to the Comelec which docketed the case as EAC No. A-13-2008. Out of the P3,000.00 appeal fee required by Section 3, Rule 40 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure, petitioner only paid the amount of P1,000.00 (plus P200.00 to cover the legal research/bailiff fees) to the Cash Division of the Comelec, per Official Receipt No. 0510287. The said payment was made on February 14, 2008.[7]


On March 17, 2008, the Comelec First Division issued an Order[8] dismissing the appeal, viz.:

Pursuant to Sections 3 and 4, Rule 40 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure which provide for the payment of appeal fee in the amount of P3,000.00 within the period to file the notice of appeal, and Section 9 (a), Rule 22 of the same Rules which provides that failure to pay the correct appeal fee is a ground for the dismissal of the appeal, the Commission (First Division) RESOLVED as it hereby RESOLVES to DISMISS the instant case for Protestee-Appellant’s failure to pay the correct appeal fee as prescribed by the Comelec Rules of Procedure within the five-(5)-day reglementary period.


SO ORDERED.

On March 28, 2008, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration[9] which the Comelec En Banc denied in the Resolution[10] dated January 21, 2009, declaring that the appeal was not perfected on time for non-payment of the complete amount of appeal fee and for late payment as well. The Comelec En Banc held that the Comelec did not acquire jurisdiction over the appeal because of the non-payment of the appeal fee on time. Thus, the Comelec First Division correctly dismissed the appeal.


Hence, the instant petition for certiorari raising the following grounds:

The respondent COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in holding that the correct appeal fee was not paid on time.


The respondent COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in failing to consider that assuming that the correct appeal fee was not paid on time, the alleged non-payment of the correct appeal fee is not in anyway attributable to herein petitioner.


The respondent COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in failing to consider that assuming that the correct appeal fee was not paid on time, there are highly justifiable and compelling reasons to resolve the subject case on the merits in the interest of justice and public interest.

Petitioner further claims that he paid a total of P4,215.00 for his appeal, as follows:

a. To RTC on January 10, 2008 ------ P3,000.00

10.00

5.00

TOTAL ------ P3,015.00


b. To Comelec on February 14, 2008 -- P1,000.00

50.00

150.00

TOTAL ------ P1,200.00

Petitioner submits that it is incumbent upon the RTC to transmit to the Comelec the entire P3,000.00 appeal fee that he paid on January 10, 2008. Petitioner also advances another interpretation of the Comelec Rules that the RTC is under obligation to remit to the Comelec the P2,000.00 representing the excess amount of the P1,000.00 appeal fee. Thus, petitioner claims that he must be deemed to have complied, in full or at least substantially, with the Comelec Rules on the payment of appeal fees.


Petitioner maintains that the alleged non-payment of the correct appeal fee is not due to his own fault or negligence. He claims that the laws on appeals in election protest cases are not yet well-established, thus, he must not be made to suffer for an oversight made in good faith. The Resolution No. 8486 of July 15, 2008 adopted by the Comelec to clarify the rules on compliance with the required appeal fees in election cases should not be applied retroactively to the subject election protest.


Lastly, petitioner invokes liberality in the application of the election law. He asserts that the popular will of the people expressed in the election of public officers should not be defeated by reason of sheer technicalities. Petitioner argues that the true will of the people of Motiong in the May 14, 2007 elections should be determined by ordering the Comelec to give due course to his appeal and to resolve the same on the merits.


In his Comment, respondent Langi, Sr. states that the petition was just a mere rehash of the Motion for Reconsideration that petitioner filed with the Comelec En Banc. Respondent maintains that for the Comelec to exercise its authority to administer proceedings, grant leniency, issue orders, and pass judgment on issues presented, it must first be shown that it has acquired the requisite jurisdiction over the subject matter pursuant to the initiatory acts and procedural compliance set as conditions precedent.


Respondent also argues that the negligence and mistakes of petitioner’s counsel bind petitioner. He then reiterates the cases where this Court held that the non-payment or insufficiency of payment of filing fees is a valid ground for the dismissal of the appeal and that the subsequent full payment thereof does not cure the jurisdictional defect.


We grant the petition.


Section 3, Rule 22 (Appeals from Decisions of Courts in Election Protest Cases) of the Comelec Rules of Procedure mandates that the notice of appeal must be filed within five (5) days after promulgation of the decision, thus:

SEC. 3. Notice of Appeal.Within five (5) days after promulgation of the decision of the court, the aggrieved party may file with said court a notice of appeal, and serve a copy thereof upon the attorney of record of the adverse party.

Moreover, Sections 3 and 4, Rule 40 of the Comelec rules require the payment of appeal fees in appealed election protest cases, the amended amount of which was set at P3,200.00 in Comelec Minute Resolution No. 02-0130,[11] to wit:

SEC. 3. Appeal Fees. – The appellant in election cases shall pay an appeal fee as follows:


(a) For election cases appealed from Regional Trial Courts……….P3,000.00 (per appellant)


(b) For election cases appealed from courts of limited jurisdiction…..P3,000.00 (per appellant)


SEC. 4. Where and When to Pay. – The fees prescribed in Sections 1, 2 and 3 hereof shall be paid to, and deposited with, the Cash Division of the Commission within a period to file the notice of appeal.

Sections 8 and 9, Rule 14 of A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC[12] also provide the procedure for instituting an appeal and the required appeal fees to be paid for the appeal to be given due course, to wit:

SEC. 8. Appeal. –- An aggrieved party may appeal the decision to the Commission on Elections, within five days after promulgation, by filing a notice of appeal with the court that rendered the decision, with copy served on the adverse counsel or party if not represented by counsel.


SEC. 9. Appeal fee. –- The appellant in an election contest shall pay to the court that rendered the decision an appeal fee of One Thousand Pesos (P1,000.00), simultaneously with the filing of the notice of appeal.

A reading of the foregoing provisions reveals that two different tribunals (the trial court that rendered the decision and the Comelec) require the payment of two different appeal fees for the perfection of appeals of election cases. This requirement in the payment of appeal fees had caused much confusion, which the Comelec addressed through the issuance of Comelec Resolution No. 8486.[13] Thus, to provide clarity and to erase any ambiguity in the implementation of the procedural rules on the payment of appeal fees for the perfection of appeals of election cases, the resolution provides:

WHEREAS, the Commission on Elections is vested with appellate jurisdiction over all contests involving elective municipal officials decided by trial courts of general jurisdiction, and those involving elective barangay officials, decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction;


WHEREAS, Supreme Court Administrative Order No. 07-4-15 (Rules of Procedure in Election Contests Before the Courts Involving Elective Municipal and Barangay Officials) promulgated on May 15, 2007 provides in Sections 8 and 9, Rule 14 thereof the procedure in instituting the appeal and the required appeal fees to be paid for the appeal to be given due course, to wit:


Section 8. Appeal. – An aggrieved party may appeal the decision to the Commission on Elections, within five days after promulgation, by filing a notice of appeal with the court that rendered the decision, with copy served on the adverse counsel or party if not represented by counsel.


Section 9. Appeal Fee. – The appellant in an election contest shall pay to the court that rendered the decision an appeal fee of One Thousand Pesos (P1,000.00), simultaneously with the filing of the notice of appeal.


WHEREAS, payment of appeal fees in appealed election protest cases is also required in Section 3, Rule 40 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure the amended amount of which was set at P3,200.00 in COMELEC Minute Resolution No. 02-0130 made effective on September 18, 2002.


WHEREAS, the requirement of these two appeal fees by two different jurisdictions had caused confusion in the implementation by the Commission on Elections of its procedural rules on payment of appeal fees for the perfection of appeals of cases brought before it from the Courts of General and Limited Jurisdictions.


WHEREAS, there is a need to clarify the rules on compliance with the required appeal fees for the proper and judicious exercise of the Commission’s appellate jurisdiction over election protest cases.


WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Commission hereby RESOLVES to DIRECT as follows:


1. That if the appellant had already paid the amount of P1,000.00 before the Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court or lower courts within the five-day period, pursuant to Section 9, Rule 14 of the Rules of Procedure in Election Cases Before the Courts Involving Elective Municipal and Barangay Officials (Supreme Court Administrative Order No. 07-4-15) and his Appeal was given due course by the Court, said appellant is required to pay the Comelec appeal fee of P3,200.00 at the Commission’s Cash Division through the Electoral Contests Adjudication Department (ECAD) or by postal money order payable to the Commission on Elections through ECAD, within a period of fifteen days (15) from the time of the filing of the Notice of Appeal with the lower court. If no payment is made within the prescribed period, the appeal shall be dismissed pursuant to Section 9(a) of Rule 22 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, which provides:


Sec. 9. Grounds for Dismissal of Appeal. -- The appeal may be dismissed upon motion of either party or at the instance of the Commission on any of the following grounds:


(a) Failure of the appellant to pay the correct appeal fee; xxx


2. That if the appellant failed to pay the P1,000.00 – appeal fee with the lower court within the five (5) day period as prescribed by the Supreme Court New Rules of Procedure but the case was nonetheless elevated to the Commission, the appeal shall be dismissed outright by the Commission, in accordance with the aforestated Section 9(a) of Rule 22 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure.


The Education and Information Department is directed to cause the publication of this resolution in two (2) newspapers of general circulation.


This resolution shall take effect on the seventh day following its publication.


SO ORDERED.

Our ruling in the very recent case of Aguilar v. Comelec,[14] quoted hereunder, squarely applies to the instant case:


Sections 8 and 9, Rule 14 of A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC provide for the following procedure in the appeal to the COMELEC of trial court decisions in election protests involving elective municipal and barangay officials:

SEC. 8. Appeal.An aggrieved party may appeal the decision to the Commission on Elections, within five days after promulgation, by filing a notice of appeal with the court that rendered the decision, with copy served on the adverse counsel or party if not represented by counsel.

SEC. 9. Appeal fee. – The appellant in an election contest shall pay to the court that rendered the decision an appeal fee of One Thousand Pesos (P1,000.00), simultaneously with the filing of the notice of appeal.

Section 8 was derived from Article IX-C, Section 2(2) of the Constitution and Rule 40, Section 3, par. 1 and Rule 41, Section 2(a) of the Rules of Court. Section 9 was taken from Rule 141, Sections 7(1) and 8(f) of the Rules of Court.


It should be noted from the afore-quoted sections of the Rule that the appeal fee of P1,000.00 is paid not to the COMELEC but to the trial court that rendered the decision. Thus, the filing of the notice of appeal and the payment of the P1,000.00 appeal fee perfect the appeal, consonant with Sections 10 and 11 of the same Rule. Upon the perfection of the appeal, the records have to be transmitted to the Electoral Contests Adjudication Department of the COMELEC within 15 days. The trial court may only exercise its residual jurisdiction to resolve pending incidents if the records have not yet been transmitted and before the expiration of the period to appeal.


With the promulgation of A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC, the previous rule that the appeal is perfected only upon the full payment of the appeal fee, now pegged at P3,200.00, to the COMELEC Cash Division within the period to appeal, as stated in the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, as amended, no longer applies.

It thus became necessary for the COMELEC to clarify the procedural rules on the payment of appeal fees. For this purpose, the COMELEC issued on July 15, 2008, Resolution No. 8486, which the Court takes judicial notice of. The resolution pertinently reads:

xxx xxx xxx


The foregoing resolution is consistent with A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC and the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, as amended. The appeal to the COMELEC of the trial court’s decision in election contests involving municipal and barangay officials is perfected upon the filing of the notice of appeal and the payment of the P1,000.00 appeal fee to the court that rendered the decision within the five-day reglementary period. The non-payment or the insufficient payment of the additional appeal fee of P3,200.00 to the COMELEC Cash Division, in accordance with Rule 40, Section 3 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, as amended, does not affect the perfection of the appeal and does not result in outright or ipso facto dismissal of the appeal. Following, Rule 22, Section 9 (a) of the COMELEC Rules, the appeal may be dismissed. And pursuant to Rule 40, Section 18 of the same rules, if the fees are not paid, the COMELEC may refuse to take action thereon until they are paid and may dismiss the action or the proceeding. In such a situation, the COMELEC is merely given the discretion to dismiss the appeal or not.


Accordingly, in the instant case, the COMELEC First Division, may dismiss petitioner’s appeal, as it in fact did, for petitioner’s failure to pay the P3,200.00 appeal fee.

Be that as it may, the Court finds that the COMELEC First Division gravely abused its discretion in issuing the order dismissing petitioner’s appeal. The Court notes that the notice of appeal and the P1,000.00 appeal fee were, respectively, filed and paid with the MTC of Kapatagan, Lanao del Norte on April 21, 2008. On that date, the petitioner’s appeal was deemed perfected. COMELEC issued Resolution No. 8486 clarifying the rule on the payment of appeal fees only on July 15, 2008, or almost three months after the appeal was perfected. Yet, on July 31, 2008, or barely two weeks after the issuance of Resolution No. 8486, the COMELEC First Division dismissed petitioner’s appeal for non-payment to the COMELEC Cash Division of the additional P3,200.00 appeal fee.

Considering that petitioner filed his appeal months before the clarificatory resolution on appeal fees, petitioner’s appeal should not be unjustly prejudiced by COMELEC Resolution No. 8486. Fairness and prudence dictate that the COMELEC First Division should have first directed petitioner to pay the additional appeal fee in accordance with the clarificatory resolution, and if the latter should refuse to comply, then, and only then, dismiss the appeal. Instead, the COMELEC First Division hastily dismissed the appeal on the strength of the recently promulgated clarificatory resolution – which had taken effect only a few days earlier. This unseemly haste is an invitation to outrage.


The COMELEC First Division should have been more cautious in dismissing petitioner’s appeal on the mere technicality of non-payment of the additional P3,200.00 appeal fee given the public interest involved in election cases. This is especially true in this case where only one vote separates the contending parties. The Court stresses once more that election law and rules are to be interpreted and applied in a liberal manner so as to give effect, not to frustrate, the will of the electorate.


WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for certiorari is GRANTED. The July 31, September 4 and October 6, 2008 Orders and the October 16 2008 Entry of Judgment issued by the COMELEC First Division in EAC (BRGY) No. 211-2008 are ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The case is REMANDED to the COMELEC First Division for disposition in accordance with this Decision.

SO ORDERED. (Emphasis supplied)

From the foregoing discussion, it is clear that the appeal from the trial court decision to the Comelec is perfected upon the filing of the notice of appeal and the payment of the P1,000.00 appeal fee to the trial court that rendered the decision. With the promulgation of A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC, the perfection of the appeal no longer depends solely on the full payment of the appeal fee to the Comelec.


In the instant case, when petitioner filed his Notice of Appeal and paid the appeal fee of P3,015.00 to the RTC on January 10, 2008, his appeal was deemed perfected. However, Comelec Resolution No. 8486 also provides that if the appellant had already paid the amount of P1,000.00 before the trial court that rendered the decision, and his appeal was given due course by the court, said appellant is required to pay the Comelec appeal fee of P3,200.00 to the Comelec’s Cash Division through the Electoral Contests Adjudication Department (ECAD) or by postal money order payable to the Comelec, within a period of fifteen (15) days from the time of the filing of the Notice of Appeal with the lower court. However, if no payment is made within the prescribed period, the appeal shall be dismissed pursuant to Section 9 (a), Rule 22 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure, which provides:

SEC. 9. Grounds for Dismissal of Appeal. – The appeal may be dismissed upon motion of either party or at the instance of the Commission on any of the following grounds:


(a) Failure of the appellant to pay the correct appeal fee; xxx

Thus, when petitioner’s appeal was perfected on January 10, 2008, within five (5) days from promulgation, his non-payment or insufficient payment of the appeal fee to the Comelec Cash Division should not have resulted in the outright dismissal of his appeal. The Comelec Rules provide in Section 9 (a), Rule 22, that for failure to pay the correct appeal fee, the appeal may be dismissed upon motion of either party or at the instance of the Comelec. Likewise, Section 18, Rule 40[15] thereof also prescribes that if the fees are not paid, the Comelec may refuse to take action on the appeal until the said fees are paid and may dismiss the action or the proceeding.


Here, petitioner paid P1,200.00 to the Comelec on February 14, 2008. Unfortunately, the Comelec First Division dismissed the appeal on March 17, 2008 due to petitioner’s failure to pay the correct appeal fee within the five-day reglementary period. In denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, the Comelec En Banc, in the Resolution dated January 21, 2009, declared that the Comelec did not acquire jurisdiction over the appeal because of the non-payment of the appeal fee on time.


However, during the pendency of petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration dated March 27, 2008, the Comelec promulgated Resolution No. 8486 to clarify the implementation of the Comelec Rules regarding the payment of filing fees. Thus, applying the mandated liberal construction of election laws,[16] the Comelec should have initially directed the petitioner to pay the correct appeal fee with the Comelec Cash Division, and should not have dismissed outright petitioner’s appeal. This would have been more in consonance with the intent of the said resolution which sought to clarify the rules on compliance with the required appeal fees.


In Barroso v. Ampig, Jr.,[17] we ruled, thus:

xxx An election contest, unlike an ordinary civil action, is clothed with a public interest. The purpose of an election protest is to ascertain whether the candidate proclaimed by the board of canvassers is the lawful choice of the people. What is sought is the correction of the canvass of votes, which was the basis of proclamation of the winning candidate. An election contest therefore involves not only the adjudication of private and pecuniary interests of rival candidates but paramount to their claims is the deep public concern involved and the need of dispelling the uncertainty over the real choice of the electorate. And the court has the corresponding duty to ascertain by all means within its command who is the real candidate elected by the people.


Moreover, the Comelec Rules of Procedure are subject to a liberal construction. This liberality is for the purpose of promoting the effective and efficient implementation of the objectives of ensuring the holding of free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections and for achieving just, expeditious and inexpensive determination and disposition of every action and proceeding brought before the Comelec. Thus we have declared:


It has been frequently decided, and it may be stated as a general rule recognized by all courts, that statutes providing for election contests are to be liberally construed to the end that the will of the people in the choice of public officers may not be defeated by mere technical objections. An election contest, unlike an ordinary action, is imbued with public interest since it involves not only the adjudication of the private interests of rival candidates but also the paramount need of dispelling the uncertainty which beclouds the real choice of the electorate with respect to who shall discharge the prerogatives of the office within their gift. Moreover, it is neither fair nor just to keep in office for an uncertain period one whose right to it is under suspicion. It is imperative that his claim be immediately cleared not only for the benefit of the winner but for the sake of public interest, which can only be achieved by brushing aside technicalities of procedure which protract and delay the trial of an ordinary action.

WHEREFORE, the petition is granted. The Order dated March 17, 2008 of the Comelec First Division and the Resolution dated January 21, 2009 of the Comelec En Banc in EAC No. A-13-2008 are ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, let the case be REMANDED to the Comelec First Division for further proceedings, in accordance with the rules and with this disposition. The Regional Trial Court, Branch 27 of Catbalogan, Samar is DIRECTED to refund to petitioner Constancio D. Pacanan, Jr., the amount of Two Thousand Pesos (P2,000.00) as the excess of the appeal fee per Official Receipt No. 6822663 paid on January 10, 2008.


SO ORDERED.


TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice


WE CONCUR:

REYNATO S. PUNO

Chief Justice


LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING

Associate Justice


(On official leave)

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO

Associate Justice


ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Associate Justice


RENATO C. CORONA

Associate Justice


CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice


MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO

Associate Justice


PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice


(No part)

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice


ARTURO D. BRION

Associate Justice


DIOSDADO M. PERALTA

Associate Justice


LUCAS P. BERSAMIN

Associate Justice


MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice


ROBERTO A. ABAD

Associate Justice


C E R T I F I C A T I O N


Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.


REYNATO S. PUNO

Chief Justice


* On official leave.

** No part.

__________________


[1] Rollo, p. 32.

[2] Id. at 34-42.

[3] Id. at 43-128.

[4] Id. at 129-139.

[5] Id. at 140-149.

[6] Supra note 3.

[7] Footnote 3 of the Order dated March 17, 2008 of the Comelec First Division, supra note 1.

[8] Supra note 1.

[9] Rollo, pp. 150-164.

[10] Supra note 2.

[11] Effective on September 18, 2002 which prescribes P3,000.00 as appeal fee plus P150.00 for bailiff’s fee and P50.00 for legal research fee.

[12] Entitled “Rules of Procedure in Election Contests before the Courts Involving Elective Municipal and Barangay Officials,” promulgated on April 24, 2007, and became effective on May 15, 2007.

[13] Entitled “In the Matter of Clarifying the Implementation of COMELEC Rules Re: Payment of Filing Fees for Appealed Cases Involving Barangay and Municipal Elective Positions from the Municipal Trial Courts, Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, Metropolitan Trial Courts and Regional Trial Courts,” promulgated on July 15, 2008.

[14] G.R. No. 185140, June 30, 2009.

[15] Rule 40, Sec. 18 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure provides:

Sec. 18. Non-payment of Prescribed Fees.If the fees above prescribed are not paid, Commission may refuse to take action thereon until they are paid and may dismiss the action or the proceeding.

[16] Section 3, Rule 1, Comelec Rules of Procedure which reads:

SEC. 3. Construction.These rules shall be liberally construed in order to promote the effective and efficient implementation of the objectives of ensuring the holding of free, orderly, hones, peaceful and credible elections and to achieve just, expeditious and inexpensive determination and disposition of every action and proceeding brought before the Commission.

[17] G.R. No. 138218, March 17, 2000, 328 SCRA 530, 541-542; citing Pahilan v. Tabalba, G.R. No. 110170, February 21, 1994, 230 SCRA 205, 212-213.


Thursday, August 6, 2009

Roque et al vs COMELEC et al. [2]


PROCEDURAL GROUNDS

  The Court is not disposed to dismiss the petition on procedural grounds advanced by respondents.

Locus Standi and Prematurity

It is true, as postulated, that to have standing, one must, as a rule, establish having suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the alleged illegal government conduct; that the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and that the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action.[38]  The prescription on standing, however, is a matter of procedure.  Hence, it may be relaxed, as the Court has often relaxed the rule for non-traditional plaintiffs, like ordinary citizens and taxpayers, when the public interest so requires, such as when the matter is of transcendental importance, of overreaching significance to society, or of paramount public interest.[39]  As we wrote in Chavez v. PCGG,[40] where issues of public importance are presented, there is no necessity to show that the suitor has experienced or is in actual danger of suffering direct and personal injury as the requisite injury is assumed.

Petitioners’ counsel, when queried, hedged on what specific constitutional proscriptions or concepts had been infringed by the award of the subject automation project to Smartmatic TIM Corporation, although he was heard to say that “our objection to the system is anchored on the Constitution itself a violation [sic] of secrecy of voting and the sanctity of the ballot.”[41]  Petitioners also depicted the covering automation contract as constituting an abdication by the Comelec of its election-related mandate under the Constitution, which is to enforce and administer all laws relative to the conduct of elections. Worse still, according to the petitioners, the abdication, with its anti-dummy dimension, is in favor of a foreign corporation that will be providing the hardware and software requirements.[42]  And when pressed further, petitioners came out with the observation that, owing in part to the sheer length of the ballot, the PCOS would not comply with Art. V, Sec. 2 of the Constitution[43] prescribing secrecy of voting and sanctity of the ballot.[44]

There is no doubt in our mind, however, about the compelling significance and the transcending public importance of the one issue underpinning this petition: the success––and the far-reaching grim implications of the failure––of the nationwide automation project that will be implemented via the challenged automation contract.

The doctrinal formulation may vary, but the bottom line is that the Court may except a particular case from the operations of its rules when the demands of justice so require.[45]  Put a bit differently, rules of procedure are merely tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice.[46]  Accordingly, technicalities and procedural barriers should not be allowed to stand in the way, if the ends of justice would not be subserved by a rigid adherence to the rules of procedure.[47]  This postulate on procedural technicalities applies to matters of locus standi and the presently invoked principle of hierarchy of courts, which discourages direct resort to the Court if the desired redress is within the competence of lower courts to grant. The policy on the hierarchy of courts, which petitioners indeed failed to observe, is not an iron-clad rule. For indeed the Court has full discretionary power to take cognizance and assume jurisdiction of special civil actions for certiorari and mandamus filed directly with it for exceptionally compelling reasons[48] or if warranted by the nature of the issues clearly and specifically raised in the petition.[49]

The exceptions that justify a deviation from the policy on hierarchy appear to obtain under the premises. The Court will for the nonce thus turn a blind eye to the judicial structure intended, first and foremost, to provide an orderly dispensation of justice. 

Hierarchy of Courts

At this stage, we shall dispose of another peripheral issue before plunging into the core substantive issues tendered in this petition.

Respondents contend that petitioners should have availed themselves of the otherwise mandatory protest mechanism set forth in Sections 55 and 58 of the procurement law (RA 9184) and the counterpart provisions found in its Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR)-A before seeking judicial remedy.  Insofar as relevant, Sec. 55 of RA 9184 provides that decisions of the bids and awards committee (BAC) in all stages of procurement may be protested, via a “verified position paper,” to the head of the procuring agency.  On the other hand, the succeeding Sec. 58 states that court action may be resorted to only after the protest contemplated in Sec. 55 shall have been completed.  Petitioners except.  As argued, the requirement to comply with the protest mechanism, contrary to what may have been suggested in Infotech, is imposed on the bidders.[50]  

Petitioners’ position is correct. As a matter of common sense, only a  bidder is entitled to receive a notice of the protested BAC action. Only a losing bidder would be aggrieved by, and ergo would have the personality to challenge, such action. This conclusion finds adequate support from the ensuing provisions of the aforesaid IRR-A:

   55.2. The verified position paper shall contain the following documents:
a)      The name of bidder;
b)      The office address of the bidder x x x.
                          

G.R. No. 188456



Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

 G.R. No. 188456
(September 10, 2009)

H. HARRY L. ROQUE, JR., JOEL R. BUTUYAN, ROMEL R. BAGARES, ALLAN JONES F. LARDIZABAL, GILBERT T. ANDRES, IMMACULADA D. GARCIA, ERLINDA T. MERCADO, FRANCISCO A. ALCUAZ, MA. AZUCENA P. MACEDA, and ALVIN A. PETERS, 
Petitioners,

- versus -

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,         
Represented by HON. CHAIRMAN JOSE MELO, COMELEC SPECIAL BIDS and AWARDS COMMITTEE, represented by its CHAIRMAN HON. FERDINAND RAFANAN, DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET and MANAGEMENT, represented by HON. ROLANDO ANDAYA, TOTAL INFORMATION MANAGEMENT CORPORATION and SMARTMATIC INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION,
Respondents.

PETE QUIRINO-QUADRA,
Petitioner-in-Intervention.

SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by its President, JUAN PONCE ENRILE,
Movant-Intervenor.
Present:
PUNO, C.J.,
QUISUMBING, 
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
CARPIO,
CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BRION,
PERALTA,
BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO, and
ABAD, JJ.
       
x-------------------------------------------------------------------------x


D E C I S I O N

VELASCO, JR., J.:

In a democratic system of government, the people’s voice is sovereign. Corollarily, choosing through the ballots the men and women who are to govern the country is perhaps the highest exercise of democracy.  It is thus the interest of the state to insure honest, credible and peaceful elections, where the sanctity of the votes and the secrecy of the ballots are safeguarded, where the will of the electorate is not frustrated or undermined.  For when the popular will itself is subverted by election irregularities, then the insidious seeds of doubt are sown and the ideal of a peaceful and smooth transition of power is placed in jeopardy.  To automate, thus breaking away from a manual system of election, has been viewed as a significant step towards clean and credible elections, unfettered by the travails of the long wait and cheating that have marked many of our electoral exercises.

The Commission on Elections (Comelec), private respondents, the National Computer Center and other computer wizards are confident that nationwide automated elections can be successfully implemented. Petitioners and some skeptics in the information technology (IT) industry have, however, their reservations, which is quite understandable.  To them, the automated election system and the untested technology Comelec has chosen and set in motion are pregnant with risks and could lead to a disastrous failure of elections. Comelec, they allege, would not be up to the challenge. Cheating on a massive scale, but this time facilitated by a machine, is perceived to be a real possibility.
  
In this petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with prayer for a restraining order and/or preliminary injunction, petitioners H. Harry L. Roque, Jr., et al., suing as taxpayers and concerned citizens, seek to nullify respondent Comelec’s award of the 2010 Elections Automation Project (automation project) to the joint venture of Total Information Management Corporation (TIM) and Smartmatic International Corporation (Smartmatic)[1] and to permanently prohibit the Comelec, TIM and Smartmatic from signing and/or implementing the corresponding contract-award.

By Resolution[2] of July 14, 2009, the Court directed the respondents as well as the University of the Philippines (UP) Computer Center, National Computer Center (NCC) and Information Technology Foundation of the Philippines (Infotech, hereinafter) to submit their collective or separate comments to the petition on or before July 24, 2009.  Before any of the comments could actually be filed, Atty. Pete Quirino-Quadra sought leave to intervene. In another resolution, the Court allowed the intervention and admitted the corresponding petition-in-intervention.[3]

On July 29, 2009, the Court heard the principal parties in oral arguments which was followed by the submission of their and the resource persons’ instructive, albeit clashing, memoranda. The Senate, through the Senate President, would later join the fray via a Motion for Leave to Intervene. In a Resolution of August 25, 2009, the Court admitted the Senate’s comment-in-intervention.

From the petition, the separate comments thereon, with their respective annexes, and other pleadings, as well as from admissions during the oral arguments, the Court gathers the following facts:

On December 22, 1997, Congress enacted Republic Act No. (RA) 8436 authorizing the adoption of an automated election system (AES) in the May 11, 1998 national and local elections and onwards.  The 1998, 2001, and 2004 national and local polls, however, came and went but purely manual elections were still the order of the day. On January 23, 2007, the amendatory RA 9369[4] was passed authorizing anew the Comelec to use an AES. Of particular relevance are Sections 6 and 10 of RA 9369––originally Secs. 5 and 8, respectively of RA 8436, as amended––each defining Comelec’s specific mandates insofar as automated elections are concerned. The AES was not utilized in the May 10, 2000 elections, as funds were not appropriated for that purpose by Congress and due to time constraints.

 RA 9369 calls for the creation of the Comelec Advisory Council[5] (CAC). CAC is to recommend, among other functions, the most appropriate, applicable and cost-effective technology to be applied to the AES.[6]  To be created by Comelec too is the Technical Evaluation Committee (TEC)[7] which is tasked to certify, through an established international certification committee, not later than three months before the elections, by categorically stating that the AES, inclusive of its hardware and software components, is operating properly and accurately based on defined and documented standards.[8]  

          In August 2008, Comelec managed to automate the regional polls in the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao[9](ARMM), using direct recording electronics (DRE) technology[10] in the province of Maguindanao; and the optical mark reader/recording (OMR) system, particularly the Central Count Optical Scan (CCOS),[11] in the rest of ARMM.[12]  What scores hailed as successful automated ARMM 2008 elections paved the way for Comelec, with some prodding from senators,[13] to prepare for a nationwide computerized run for the 2010 national/local polls, with the many lessons learned from the ARMM experience influencing, according to the NCC, the technology selection for the 2010 automated elections.[14]

Accordingly, in early March 2009, the Comelec released the Request for Proposal (RFP), also known as Terms of Reference(TOR), for the nationwide automation of the voting, counting, transmission, consolidation and canvassing of votes for the May 10, 2010 Synchronized National and Local Elections. What is referred to also in the RFP and other contract documents as the 2010 Elections Automation Project (Automation Project) consists of three elaborate components, as follows:

          Component 1: Paper-Based AES.[15] 1-A. Election Management System (EMS); 1-B Precinct-Count Optic Scan (PCOS)[16] System and 1-C. Consolidation/Canvassing System (CCS);
          Component 2: Provision for Electronic Transmission of Election Results using Public Telecommunications Network; and
Component 3: Overall Project Management

 And obviously to address the possibility of systems failure, the RFP required interested bidders to submit, among other things:  a continuity plan[17] and a back-up plan. [18]

Under the two-envelope system designed under the RFP,[19] each participating bidder shall submit, as part of its bid, an Eligibility Envelope[20] that should inter alia establish the bidder’s eligibility to bid. On the other hand, the second envelope, or the Bid Envelope itself, shall contain two envelopes that, in turn, shall contain the technical proposal and the financial proposal, respectively.[21]

Subsequently, the Comelec Special Bids and Awards Committee (SBAC), earlier constituted purposely for the aforesaid project, caused the publication in different newspapers of the Invitation to Apply for Eligibility and to Bid[22] for the procurement of goods and services to be used in the automation project.[23]  Meanwhile, Congress enacted RA 9525 appropriating some PhP 11.3 billion as supplemental budget for the May 10, 2010 automated national and local elections.  

Of the ten (10) invitation-responding consortia which obtained the bid documents, only seven (7) submitted sealed applications for eligibility and bids[24] which, per Bid Bulletin No. 24, were to be opened on a pre-set date, following the convening of the pre-bid conference.  Under the RFP, among those eligible to participate in the bidding are manufacturers, suppliers and/or distributors forming themselves into a joint venture.   joint venture is defined as a group of two or more manufacturers, suppliers and/or distributors that intend to be jointly and severally responsible or liable for a particular contract.[25] 

 Among the submitted bids was that of the joint venture (JV) of TIM and Smartmatic, the former incorporated under the Corporation Code of the Philippines. Smartmatic, on the other hand, was organized under the laws of Barbados.[26]  For a stated amount, said JV proposed to undertake the whole automation project, inclusive of the delivery of 82,200 PCOS machines.  After the conclusion of the eligibility evaluation process, only three consortia[27] were found and thus declared as eligible.  Further on, following the opening of the passing bidders’ Bid Envelope and evaluating the technical and financial proposals therein contained, the SBAC, per its Res. No. 09-001, s.-2009, declared the above-stated bid of the JV of TIM-Smartmatic as the single complying calculated bid.[28]   As required by the RFP, the bid envelope contained an outline of the joint venture’s back-up and continuity or contingency plans,[29] in case of a systems breakdown or any such eventuality which shall result in the delay, obstruction or nonperformance of the electoral process.

After declaring TIM-Smartmatic as the best complying bidder, the SBAC then directed the joint venture to undertake post-qualification screening, and its PCOS prototype machines––the Smarmatic Auditable Electronic System (SAES) 1800––to undergo end-to-end[30] testing to determine compliance with the pre-set criteria.

 In its Memorandum of June 01, 2009, on the Subject: Systems Evaluation Consolidated Report and Status Report on the Post-Qualification Evaluation Procedures, the SBAC Technical Working Group (TWG) stated that it was undertaking a 4-day (May 27 to May 30, 2009) test evaluation of TIM and Smartmatic’s proposed PCOS project machines.  Its conclusion: “The demo systems presented PASSED all tests as required in the 26-item criteria specified in the [RFP]” with 100% accuracy rating.[31]  The TWG also validated the eligibility, and technical and financial qualifications of the TIM-Smartmatic joint venture.

On June 9, 2009, Comelec, upon the recommendation of its SBAC, the CAC and other stakeholders, issued Resolution No. (Res.) 8608[32] authorizing the SBAC to issue, subject to well-defined conditions, the notice of award and notice to proceed in favor of the winning joint venture.

Soon after, TIM wrote Comelec expressing its desire to quit the JV partnership.  In time, however, the parties were able to patch up what TIM earlier described as irreconcilable differences between partners.

What followed was that TIM and Smartmatic, pursuant to the Joint Venture Agreement (JVA),[33] caused the incorporation of a joint venture corporation (JVC) that would enter into a contract with the Comelec.  On July 8, 2009, the Securities and Exchange Commission issued a certificate of incorporation in favor of Smartmatic TIM Corporation.  Two days after, or on July 10, 2009, Comelec and Smartmatic TIM Corporation, as provider, executed a contract[34] for the lease of goods and services under the contract for the contract amount of PhP 7,191,484,739.48, payable as the “Goods and Services are delivered and/or progress is made in accordance [with pre-set] Schedule of Payments.”[35]   On the same date, a Notice to Proceed[36] was sent to, and received by, Smartmatic TIM Corporation.

Meanwhile, or on July 9, 2009, petitioners interposed the instant recourse which, for all intents and purposes, impugns the validity and seeks to nullify the July 10, 2009 Comelec-Smartmatic-TIM Corporation automation contract adverted to.  Among others, petitioners pray that respondents be permanently enjoined from implementing the automation project on the submission that:

            PUBLIC RESPONDENTS COMELEC AND COMELEC-SBAC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN AWARDING THE 2010 ELECTIONS AUTOMATION PROJECT TO PRIVATE RESPONDENTS TIM AND SMARTMATIC FOR THE FOLLOWING REASONS:
                                                                       
x x x COMELEC DID NOT CONDUCT ANY PILOT TESTING OF THE x x x PCOS MACHINES OFFERED BY PRIVATE RESPONDENTS SMARTMATIC AND TIM, IN VIOLATION OF [RA] 8436 (AS AMENDED BY [RA] 9369)
                                                       
THE [PCOS] MACHINES [THUS] OFFERED BY PRIVATE RESPONDENTS x x x DO NOT SATISFY THE MINIMUM SYSTEM CAPABILITIES SET BY [RA] NO. 8436 (AS AMENDED BY [RA] 9369).
                                         
PRIVATE RESPONDENTS x x x DID NOT SUBMIT THE REQUIRED DOCUMENTS DURING THE BIDDING PROCESS THAT SHOULD ESTABLISH THE DUE EXISTENCE, COMPOSITION, AND SCOPE OF THEIR JOINT VENTURE, IN VIOLATION OF THE SUPREME COURT’S HOLDING IN INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY FOUNDATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. COMELEC (G.R. No. 159139, Jan. 13, 2004).
                                                     
THERE WAS NO VALID JOINT VENTURE AGREEMENT [JVA] BETWEEN PRIVATE RESPONDENTS SMARTMATIC AND TIM DURING THE BIDDING, IN VIOLATION OF THE SUPREME COURT’S HOLDING IN INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY FOUNDATION OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. COMELEC x x x WHICH REQUIRES A JOINT VENTURE TO INCLUDE A COPY OF ITS [JVA] DURING THE BIDDING.
                                                     
THE ALLEGED JOINT VENTURE COMPOSED OF PRIVATE RESPONDENTS SMARTMATIC AND TIM, DOES NOT SATISFY THE SUPREME COURT’S DEFINITION OF A “JOINT VENTURE” IN INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY FOUNDATION OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. COMELEC x x x WHICH “REQUIRES A COMMUNITY OF INTEREST IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THE SUBJECT MATTER.”
Filed as it was before contract signing, the petition understandably did not implead Smartmatic TIM Corporation, doubtless an indispensable party to these proceedings, an incident that did not escape Comelec’s notice.[37]

As a preliminary counterpoint, either or both public and private respondents question the legal standing or locus standi of petitioners, noting in this regard that the petition did not even raise an issue of transcendental importance, let alone a constitutional question.

As an additional point, respondents also urge the dismissal of the petition on the ground of prematurity, petitioners having failed to avail themselves of the otherwise mandatory built-in grievance mechanism under Sec. 55 in relation to Sec. 58 of RA 9184, also known as the Government Procurement Reform Act, as shall be discussed shortly.



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