RULING
PCOS Meets Minimum Capabilities Standards
As another ground for the nullification of the automation contract, petitioners posit the view that the PCOS machines do not satisfy the minimum system capabilities prescribed by RA 8436, as amended. To a specific point, they suggest that the PCOS system offered and accepted lacks the features that would assure accuracy in the recording and reading of votes, as well as in the tabulation, consolidation/canvassing, electronic transmission, storage results and accurate ballot counting.[75] In this particular regard, petitioners allege that, based on Smartmatic’s website, the PCOS has a margin of error of from 2% to 10%, way beyond that of the required 99.99% accuracy in the counting of votes.[76]
The minimum system capabilities provision cited is Sec. 7 of RA 8436, as amended, and the missing features referred to by petitioners are pars. (b) and (j). In full, Sec. 7 of RA 8436, as amended, reads:
SEC. 6. Minimum System Capabilities. - The automated election system must at least have the following functional capabilities:
(a) Adequate security against unauthorized access;
(b) Accuracy in recording and reading of votes as well as in the tabulation, consolidation/canvassing, electronic transmission, and storage of results;
(c) Error recovery in case of non-catastrophic failure of device;
(d) System integrity which ensures physical stability and functioning of the vote recording and counting process;
(e) Provision for voter verified paper audit trail;
(f) System auditability which provides supporting documentation for verifying the correctness of reported election results;
(g) An election management system for preparing ballots and programs for use in the casting and counting of votes and to consolidate, report and display election result in the shortest time possible;
(h) Accessibility to illiterates and disabled voters;
(i) Vote tabulating program for election, referendum or plebiscite;
(j) Accurate ballot counters;
(k) Data retention provision;
(l) Provide for the safekeeping, storing and archiving of physical or paper resource used in the election process;
(m) Utilize or generate official ballots as herein defined;
(a) Provide the voter a system of verification to find out whether or not the machine has registered his choice; and
(o) Configure access control for sensitive system data and function.
In the procurement of this system, the Commission shall develop and adopt an evaluation system to ascertain that the above minimum system capabilities are met. The evaluation system shall be developed with the assistance of an advisory council.
From the records before us, the Court is fairly satisfied that the Comelec has adopted a rigid technical evaluation mechanism, a set of 26-item/check list criteria, as will be enumerated shortly, to ensure compliance with the above minimum systems capabilities.
The SBAC Memorandum[77] of June 03, 2009, as approved by Comelec Res. 8608,[78] categorically stated that the SBAC-TWG submitted its report that TIM/Smartmatic’s proposed systems and machines PASSED all the end-to-end demo tests using the aforementioned 26-item criteria, inclusive of the accuracy rating test of at least 99.955%. As appearing in the SBAC-TWG report, the corresponding answers/remarks to each of the 26 individual items are as herein indicated:[79]
ITEM | REQUIREMENT | REMARK/DESCRIPTION |
1 | Does the system allow manual feeding of a ballot into the PCOS machine? | Yes. The proposed PCOS machine accepted the test ballots which were manually fed one at a time. |
2 | Does the system scan a ballot sheet at the speed of at least 2.75 inches per second? | Yes. A 30-inch ballot was used in this test. Scanning the 30-inch ballot took 2.7 seconds, which translated to 11.11inches per second. |
3 | Is the system able to capture and store in an encrypted format the digital images of the ballot for at least 2,000 ballot sides (1,000 ballots, with back to back printing)? | Yes the system captured the images of the 1,000 ballots in encrypted format. Each of the 1,000 images files contained the images of the front and back sides of the ballot, totaling to 2,000 ballot side. To verify the captured ballot images, decrypted copies of the encrypted files were also provided. The same were found to be digitized representations of the ballots cast. |
4 | Is the system a fully integrated single device as described in item no. 4 of Component 1-B? | Yes. The proposed PCOS is a fully integrated single device, with built-in printer and built-in data communications ports (Ethernet and USB). |
5 | Does the system have a scanning resolution of at least 200 dpi? | Yes. A portion of a filled up marked oval was blown up using image editor software to reveal the number of dots per inch. The sample image showed 200 dpi. File properties of the decrypted image file also revealed 200 dpi. |
6 | Does the system scan in grayscale? | Yes. 30 shades of gray were scanned in the test PCOS machine, 20 of which were required, exceeding the required 4-bit/16 levels of gray as specified in the Bid Bulletin No. 19. |
7 | Does the system require authorization and authentication of all operators, such as, but not limited to, usernames and passwords, with multiple user access levels? | Yes. The system required the use of a security key with different sets of passwords/PINs for Administrator and Operator users. |
8 | Does the system have an electronic display? | Yes. The PCOS machine makes use of an LCD display to show information: · if a ballot may be inserted into the machine; · if a ballot is being processed; if a ballot is being rejected; · on other instructions and information to the voter/operator. |
9 | Does the system employ error handling procedures, including, but not limited to, the use of error prompts and other related instructions? | Yes. The PCOS showed error messages on its screen whenever a ballot is rejected by the machine and gives instructions to the voter on what to do next, or when there was a ballot jam error. |
10 | Does the system count the voter’s vote as marked on the ballot with an accuracy rating of at least 99.995%? | Yes. The two rounds of tests were conducted for this test using only valid marks/shades on the ballots. 20,000 marks were required to complete this test, with only one (1) allowable reading error. 625 ballots with 32 marks each were used for this test. During the comparison of the PCOS-generated results with the manually prepared/predetermined results, it was found out that there were seven (7) marks which were inadvertently missed out during ballot preparation by the TWG. Although the PCOS-generated results turned out to be 100% accurate, the 20,000-mark was not met thereby requiring the test to be repeated. To prepare for other possible missed out marks,650 ballots with (20,800 marks) were used for the next round of test, which also yielded 100% accuracy. |
11 | Does the system detect and reject fake or spurious, and previously scanned ballots? | Yes. This test made use of one (1) photocopied ballot and one (1) “re-created” ballot. Both were rejected by the PCOS. |
12 | Does the system scan both sides of a ballot and in any orientation in one pass? | Yes. Four (4) ballots with valid marks were fed into the PCOS machine in the four (4) portrait orientations specified in Bid Bulletin No. 4 (either back or front, upside down or right side up), and all were accurately captured. |
13 | Does the system have necessary safeguards to determine the authenticity of a ballot, such as, but not limited to, the use of bar codes, holograms, color shifting ink, micro printing, to be provided on the ballot, which can be recognized by the system? | Yes. The system was able to recognize if the security features on the ballot are “missing”. Aside from the test on the fake or spurious ballots (Item No. 11), three (3) test ballots with tampered bar codes and timing marks were used and were all rejected by the PCOS machine. The photocopied ballot in the test for Item No. 11 was not able to replicate the UV ink pattern on top portion of the ballot causing the rejection of the ballot. |
14 | Are the names of the candidates pre-printed on the ballot? | Yes. The Two sample test ballots of different lengths were provided: one (1) was 14 inches long while the other was 30 inches long. Both were 8.5 inches wide. The first showed 108 pre-printed candidate names for the fourteen (14) contests/positions, including two (2) survey questions on gender and age group, and a plebiscite question. The other showed 609 pre-printed candidate names, also for fourteen (14) positions including three (3) survey questions. |
15 | Does each side of the ballot sheet accommodate at least 300 names of candidates with a minimum font size of 10, in addition to other mandatory information required by law? | Yes. The 30-inch ballot, which was used to test Item No. 2, contained 309 names for the national positions and 300 names for local positions. The total pre-printed names on the ballot totaled 609. This type of test ballot was also used for test voting by the public, including members of the media. Arial Narrow, font size 10, was used in the printing of the candidate names. |
16 | Does the system recognize full shade marks on the appropriate space on the ballot opposite the name of the candidate to be voted for? | Yes. The ballots used for the accuracy test (Item No. 10), which made use of full shade marks, were also used in this test and were accurately recognized by the PCOS machine. |
17 | Does the system recognize partial shade marks on the appropriate space on the ballot opposite the name of the candidate to be voted for? | Yes. Four (4) test ballots were used with one (1) mark each per ballot showing the following pencil marks: · top half shade; · bottom half shade; · left half shade; and · right half shade These partial shade marks were all recognized by the PCOS machine |
18 | Does the system recognize check (ΓΌ)marks on the appropriate space on the ballot opposite the name of the candidate to be voted for? | Yes. One (1) test ballot with one check (ΓΌ) mark, using a pencil, was used for this test. The mark was recognized successfully. |
19 | Does the system recognize x marks on the appropriate space on the ballot opposite the name of the candidate to be voted for? | Yes. One (1) test ballot with one x mark, using a pencil, was used for this test. The mark was recognized successfully. |
20 | Does the system recognize both pencil and ink marks on the ballot? | Yes. The 1000 ballots used in the accuracy test (Item No. 10) were marked using the proposed marking pen by the bidder. A separate ballot with one (1) pencil mark was also tested. This mark was also recognized by the PCOS machine. Moreover, the tests for Items No. 17, 18 and 19 were made using pencil marks on the ballots. |
21 | In a simulation of a system shut down, does the system have error recovery features? | Yes. Five (5) ballots were used in this test. The power cord was pulled from the PCOS while the 3rd ballot was in the middle of the scanning procedure, such that it was left “hanging” in the ballot reader. After resumption of regular power supply, the PCOS machine was able to restart successfully with notification to the operator that there were two (2) ballots already cast in the machine. The “hanging” 3rd ballot was returned to the operator and was able to be re-fed into the PCOS machine. The marks on all five (5) were all accurately recognized. |
22 | Does the system have transmission and consolidation/canvassing capabilities? | Yes. The PCOS was able to transmit to the CCS during the end-to-end demonstration using GLOBE prepaid Internet kit. |
23 | Does the system generate a backup copy of the generated reports, in a removable data storage device? | Yes. The PCOS saves a backup copy of the ERs, ballot images, statistical report and audit log into a Compact Flash (CF) Card. |
24 | Does the system have alternative power sources, which will enable it to fully operate for at least 12 hours? | Yes. A 12 bolt 18AH battery lead acid was used in this test. The initial test had to be repeated due to a short circuit, after seven (7) hours from start-up without ballot scanning. This was explained by TIM-Smartmatic to be caused by non-compatible wiring of the battery to the PCOS. A smaller wire than what is required was inadvertently used, likening the situation to incorrect wiring of a car battery. Two (2) COMELEC electricians were called to confirm TIM-Smartmatic’s explanation. The PCOS machine was connected to regular power and started successfully. The following day, the “re-test” was completed in 12 hours and 40 minutes xxx 984 ballots were fed into the machine. The ER, as generated by the PCOS was compared with predetermined result, showed 100% accuracy. |
25 | Is the system capable of generating and printing reports? | Yes. The PCOS prints reports via its built-in printer which includes: 1. Initialization Report; 2. Election Returns (ER); 3. PCOS Statistical Report; 4. Audit Log. |
26 | Did the bidder successfully demonstrate | Yes. An end-to-end demonstration of all proposed systems was presented covering: importing of election data into the EMS; creation of election configuration data for the PCOS and the CCS using EMS; creation of ballot faces using EMS; configuring the PCOS and the CCS using the EMS-generated election configuration file; initialization, operation, generation of reports and backup using the PCOS; electronic transmission of results to the: [1] from the PCOS to city/municipal CCS and the central server. [2] from the city/municipal CCS to the provincial CCS. [3] from the provincial CCS to the national CCS; receipt and canvass of transmitted results: [1] by the city/municipal CCS from the PCOS. [2] by the provincial CCS from the city/municipal CCS. [3] by the national CCS from the provincial CCS; receipt of the transmittal results by the central server from the PCOS. |
Given the foregoing and absent empirical evidence to the contrary, the Court, presuming regularity in the performance of regular duties, takes the demo-testing thus conducted by SBAC-TWG as a reflection of the capability of the PCOS machines, although the tests, as Comelec admits,[80] were done literally in the Palacio del Governador building, where a room therein simulated a town, the adjoining room a city, etc. Perusing the RFP, however, the real worth of the PCOS system and the machines will of course come after they shall have been subjected to the gamut of acceptance tests expressly specified in the RFP, namely, the lab test, field test, mock election test, transmission test and, lastly, the final test and sealing procedure of all PCOS and CCS units using the actual Election Day machine configuration.[81]
Apropos the counting-accuracy feature of the PCOS machines, petitioners no less impliedly admit that the web page they appended to their petition, showing a 2% to 10% failing rate, is no longer current.[82] And if they bothered to examine the current website of Smartmatic specifically dealing with its SAES 1800, the PCOS system it offered, they would have readily seen that the advertised accuracy rating is over “99.99999%.”[83] Moreover, a careful scrutiny of the old webpage of Smarmatic reveals that the 2% to 10% failure rate applied to “optical scanners” and not to SAES. Yet the same page discloses that the SAES has “100%” accuracy. Clearly, the alleged 2% to 10% failing rate is now irrelevant and the Court need not belabor this and the equally irrelevant estoppel principle petitioners impose on us.
Intervenor Cuadra’s concern relates to the auditability of the election results. In this regard, it may suffice to point out that PCOS, being a paper-based technology, affords audit since the voter would be able, if need be, to verify if the machine had scanned, recorded and counted his vote properly. Moreover, it should also be noted that the PCOS machine contains an LCD screen, one that can be programmed or configured to display to the voter his votes as read by the machine. [84]